Reason for acquittal 'Armenian Genocide': Freedom of thought

2024-03-12 12:59:50


	 

	AMED – In the justification of the acquittal decision in the case filed against the former executives of the Amed Bar Association on the grounds of "Armenian Genocide", it was emphasized that the statement in question was "within the scope of freedom of thought". 

	 

	Cihan Aydın, former President of the Amed Bar Association, and Muhlis Oğurgül, Ahmet Dağ, Erhan Aytekin, Fırat Üger, Gazal Bayram Koluman, Mehmet Akbaş, Serdar Çelebi, Tevfik Karahan, Ömer Şeran and Özgür Yılmaz Biçen, who were in the bar association management during period, on the grounds of the statement "Armenian Genocide" The decision hearing of the case was concluded on February 2.

	 

	Aydin and his entourage were accused of "publicly humiliating the Turkish nation, the state, Parliament, government and judicial bodies of the Republic of Turkey" due to the statement "Armenian Genocide" in their statement on "24 April Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day". Diyarbakır 9th The High Criminal Court had acquitted the bar association management.

	 

	FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

	 

	The court explained the reason for the acquittal decision. The court stated that the statement used as justification for the allegation remained within the limits of criticism and was "within the scope of freedom of thought". In the reasoned decision, legal doctrines aimed at criticism and humiliation and the decisions of the Constitutional Court (AYM) were pointed out.

	 

	In the decision, the terms "deportation", "major disaster", "forced displacement", "genocide", which were included in the statement made by the Amed Bar Association and claimed to constitute a crime, were used in domestic law and international law to which Turkey is a party. examined within the scope of contracts; It was noted that there was no intention to humiliate the institutions in question with the statements in the posts.

	 

	In the decision, it was stated that "(…) the post made was evaluated as an expression of thought within the scope of criticism, and therefore, based on the fact that the post subject to trial was evaluated as an expression of thought within the scope of freedom of thought, it is understood that the post in question did not constitute the material elements of the crime subject to trial (…)".